Federal Procedure—Rule of Erie R. R. v Tompkins—Determination of Applicable Law in Absence of State Decision by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 24 Issue 1 
January 1938 
Federal Procedure—Rule of Erie R. R. v Tompkins—Determination 
of Applicable Law in Absence of State Decision 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Federal Procedure—Rule of Erie R. R. v Tompkins—Determination of Applicable Law in Absence of State 
Decision, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 132 (1938). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/16 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
132 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24
FEDERAL ProcEDuR,-RuLE OF ERIE R. R. v. To1MPKINS-DETERMINATION
Op APPLICABLE LAW IN ABSENCE OF STATE DEcIsoN-[Federal].-"Except
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.* * * There is no
federal general common law."' Erie R. R. v. Tompkins 2 by these pronounce-
ments revolutionized federal substantive law3 but left doubt as to the prin-
ciples of law applicable when the state law is conflicting, nebulous, or non-
existent.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided Toomey V.
Toomey4 by what prior to Erie R. R. v. Tompkins had been the general
law, construing certain agreements which decedent had signed as evidenc-
ing no intention of making his brother and sister beneficiaries of his life
insurance which his wife held. The court recognized its duty to apply
Illinois law but, finding no case precisely in point and "no Illinois decision
which would sustain a decision in favor of appellants," it resorted to the
old established federal rule. In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Jackson,(
decided by the same court, wherein a disability insurer was held liable to
insured who became totally and permanently disabled during the period of
grace following the date fixed for the semi-annual premium payment, it
was stated that since the exact question had never been presented to or
decided by the Missouri courts, "we have no choice but to consider the ques-
tion as we have previously considered it, exercising an independent judg-
ment with respect to the issues presented." 7 The court limited itself by the
proposition that the decision reached must not be out of harmony with
principles of law of the State of Missouri and affirmed the judgment be-
1. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
2. For discussion of this case see Comment (1938) 23 WASHINGTON U.
LAW QUARTERLY 568; McCormick & Hewins, The Collapse of "General
Law" in the Federal Courts (1938) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 126; Shulman, The
Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1336; Schmidt, Substantive
Law Applied by the Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins
(1938) 16 Texas L. Rev. 512; Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal
Jurisprudence? (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 421; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of
Swift v. Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 609; Comment Note (1938) 114
A. L. R. 1500.
3. The rule of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins was not intended to affect proce-
dural law. First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co.
(C. C. A. 8, August 8, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 416; Kelly v. Duke Power Co.
(C. C. A. 4, June 6, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 529; Erwin v. Texas Co. (C. C. A.
8, July 13, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 806. Query, as to matters in the zone between
substantive and procedural law. Summers v. Hearst (D. C. S. D. N. Y.
June 7, 1938) 23 F. Supp. 986. That substantive federal equity jurispru-
dence has now a status analogous to that of federal common law, see
McCormick & Hewins, supra note 2, at 140-142; Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins.
Co. (1938) 58 S. Ct. 860; First Trust & Savings Bank v. Iowa-Wisconsin
Bridge Co. (C. C. A. 8, August 8, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 416; Summers v.
Hearst (D. C. S. D. N. Y. June 7, 1938) 23 F. Supp. 986.
4. (C. C. A. 7, July 28, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 736.
5. Id. at 739.
6. (C. C. A. 7, August 10, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 950, cert. denied (U. S.
1938) 6 U. S. Law Week 180.
7. 98 F. (2d) at 952.
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cause the Missouri Supreme Court construed ambiguities and inconsistencies
liberally in favor of the insured. In both cases, the court exercised an
independent judgment, governing itself in the former by the purely nega-
tive factor that no decision existed which would sustain a holding for
defendant, while advancing the affirmative suggestion in the latter that
the general principles of state jurisprudence$ should control.9 In partial
conflict with the Jackson case is Fireman's Fund Indemnity Co. v. Kennedyl o
where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, absent a con-
trolling state decision, it would apply its independent judgment and find
for the insurance company despite the rule of the applicable state that the
insurance clause in question was to be construed most strongly against the
company.
In effect these courts are continuing to employ the doctrine that "where
state decisions are in conflict or do not clearly establish what the local law
is, the federal court may exercise an independent judgment and determine
the law of the case,"'" a doctrine which was worked out under the corollary
to the rule of Swift v. Tyson"2 applicable to federal "local law" jurispru-
dence 13 in spite of the Rule of Decisions Act 14. If Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
is construed broadly as meaning that in any matters not governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Act of Congress only state law shall be applied,
it is difficult to see on what basis "independent judgment" may be exercised
or to understand what law the courts are applying when they resort to
independent judgment if there is no federal general common law.15
8. In this connection it is to be noted that application of the general
principles of a state's courts may include its conflicts of law rules. Rachlin
v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (C. C. A. 2, May 2, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 597;
Schram v. Poole (C. C. A. 9, June 16, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 566; Schram v.
Smith (C. C. A. 9, June 27, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 662; Ostroff v. New York
Life Ins. Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. June 17, 1938) 23 F. Supp. 724; Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation v. Md. Casualty Co. (D. C. D. Md. July 6, 1938)
23 F. Supp. 1008. EMpansion of the field of constitutional law in the future
to unify these rules is likely, see McCormick & Hewins, supra, note 2, at
139.
9. See also Hack v. American Surety Co. of New York (C. C. A. 7,
April 26, 1938) 96 F. (2d) 939.
10. (C. C. A. 9, June 30, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 882.
11. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin (1925) 268 U. S.
458, 463.
12. (1842) 16 Pet. 1.
13. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin (1925) 268 U. S. 458
and cases cited; Brainard v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A.
7, 1937) 91 F. (2d) 880; Pryor v. National Lead Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1937)
87 F. (2d) 461; Christian v. Waialua Agr. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1937) 93 F.
(2d) 603. "* * * If the questions presented are questions of local law, we
are required, ordinarily, to sustain it by the great deference due the local
tribunals, unless there is a sense of clear error committed." Christian v.
Waialua Agr. Co., supra, at 609.
14. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, (1928) 28 U. S. C. A. sec.
725: "The laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or providd, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
15. That there remains "specialized" federal law for jurisdictions other
19381
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Some courts seem to give Erie R. R. v. Tompkins this enlarged applica-
tion, holding that they may only decide as the state supreme court would
were the case before it, as evidenced both by its past decisions and con-
sidered dicta.16 In Jones v. Casualty Co.,17 where there was no case directly
in point and a definite conflict of authority elsewhere on the issue, the court
followed a state case which merely cited with approval the leading case on
one side. In Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Bank of Wichita Falls,8 the
court followed a Texas case which purported to "adopt" the general law
in other jurisdictions, saying that the Texas Supreme Court would there-
fore probably arrive at the same conclusion.19 Another court has said that
it would "administer the same justice which the state court would admin-
ister between the same parties.' 02
Can federal courts administer the "same justice" that state courts would
when the federal courts are bound not only by state statutes and supreme
court decisions, but by dicta, opinions, general rules, and even lower court
rulings?21 It would seem that the federal courts must operate within a
narrower range of discretion than an analogous state court in that they
may neither overrule prior decisions nor examine freely on grounds of
public policy or legal soundness, the rules of other jurisdictions, as con-
trasted with courts which not infrequently find grounds for their opinions
in other states.
These cases indicate the difficulties occasioned by the broad statement of
the rule in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins and show that the limits of that rule
need to be defined and clarified. Altogether aside from questions of the
desirability of inflexible adoption of state decisions or of substantial elimi-
nation of the judicial discretion of federal judges, unqualified adherence
to the implications of that rule may be pragmatically impossible. The strug-
than diversity of citizenship is evident from Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion
in Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co. (1938) 304
U. S. 92, which was handed down the same day as Erie R. R. v. Tompkins
and in which "federal common law" was applied in determining contro-
versies over rights in interstate streams. For "specialized" federal law in
other fields see McCormick & Hewins, supra note 2, at 126, 142, 143, n. 76,
n. 82; Shulman, supra note 2, at 1350; Downey v. City of Yonkers (D. C.
S. D. N. Y., June 13, 1938) 23 F. Supp. 1018.
16. McCormick & Hewins, supra, note 2, at 136. Apparently in accord
with this view is the Amendment to paragraph 5 (b) of Rule 38 of the
Rules of the Supreme Couit, promulgated by order of May 31, 1938. 303
U. S. xv.
17. (D. C. E. D. Va. July 16, 1938) 23 F. Supp. 932.
18. (C. C: A. 5, June 10, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 249.
19. Neither the Jones nor the Wichita Falls case represents a clear hold-
ing to the rule of such decisions only as the state court would make, since
in the Jones case there was a complete conflict even among the federal
cases between which the court had to decide, and in the Wichita Falls case
the court may have been merely rationalizing its "general law" position by
mentioning the fact that the state supreme court had "adopted" it.
20. Sommer v. Nakdimen (C. C. A. 8, July 5, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 715,
719; see also Huffman v. Buckingham Transp. Co. (C. C. A. 10, Sept. 15,
1938) 98 F. (2d) 916.
21. Hack v. American Surety Co. v. N. Y. (C. C. A. 7, April 16, 1938)
96 F. (2d) 939.
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gle of the federal courts to reconcile the rule with requisite independence
towards doubtful or undecided questions is manifest. To quote Professor
Corbin, "If it [Erie R. R. v. Tompkins] is an admonition to federal judges
that there is no 'federal general common law' that is to be found solely in
the opinions of other federal judges, much is thereby gained. But if it is a
direction to substitute an omnipresence brooding over Pennsylvania alone,
in place of the roe-like bird whose wings have been believed to overspread
forty-eight states, something has indeed been lost.
' 22
C. A.
REAL PROPERTY-ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY-HOMESTEAD RIGHTS IN Two
PERSONS IN THE SAME FAMILY-[Missouri].-In a recent Missouri case'
land was held in an estate by the entirety. After the death of the husband
a judgment in favor of plaintiff on a joint note executed by the man and
wife subsequent to acquisition of the land was sought to be levied thereon.
Held, that the wife under Missouri statutes2 acquired a right of homestead
and exemptions upon the filing of the deed to herself and husband, and
that the husband having failed to claim such exemptions, she might do so
after his death.
This case emphasizes a peculiar interpretation of the Homestead Stat-
utes' and the Married Woman's Act4 when construed together. Under the
Homestead Act alone,5 before the Married Woman's Statute,( the wife could
never claim an exemption unless the husband died, absconded, or absented
himself from his usual place of abode.7 She could never claim it when
the husband was alive and present regardless of whether the title to the
property was in the husband, wife, or jointly in both.8 But when the
husband died leaving a widow or minor children, the homestead right
descended to them and this was not made conditional upon the husband's
having failed to claim. 9 Under the Married Woman's Act 10 the wife may
22. Note, The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 Yale L. J.
1351, 1353.
1. Ahmann v. Kemper (Mo. 1938) 119 S. W. (2d) 256.
2. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 608, 615, 2998.
3. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
5. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 608 provides in part that "The homestead of
every housekeeper or head of a family, consisting of a dwelling house and
appurtenances, and the land used in connection therewith * * * [shall] be
exempt from attachment and execution."
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998.
7. Gladney v. Berkley (1898) 75 Mo. App. 98; White v. Smith (1904)
104 Mo. App. 199. 78 S. W. 51.
8. Martin v. Barnett (1911) 158 Mo. App. 375, 138 S. W. 538.
9. Armor v. Lewis (1913) 252 Mo. 568, 161 S. W. 251.
10. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998, after stating that a married woman shall
be deemed a femrme sole, provides that "a married woman may invoke all
exemption and homestead laws now in force for the protection of personal
and real property owned by the head of a family, except in cases where
the husband has claimed such exemption for the protection of his own
property." See also Luster v. Cook (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 459.
1938]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol24/iss1/16
